Team
Prof. Dr. Joel Thiago Klein
Principal Investigator
Goethe University
Visiting Research Professor
Academic Profile
Visiting Research Professor at Goethe University Frankfurt and Professor of Modern Philosophy, Ethics, and Political Philosophy at the Federal University of Paraná. He completed a postdoctoral fellowship at Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München with a CAPES/Alexander von Humboldt scholarship for experienced researchers. He is also an associate member of the Centre for Philosophy at the University of Lisbon and of the Graduate Program in Philosophy at the Federal University of Santa Catarina. He has edited more than thirty journal issues and eight books, including commentaries on Kant’s works. In addition to his research on Kant’s theoretical and practical philosophy, both in historical and systematic perspectives, his work engages with topics in epistemology, democracy, philosophy of law, philosophy of history, and theories of justice.
Selected Publications
Kant and the construction of pure reason: an analogy with a chemical experiment
Abstract:
​This paper defends a constructive interpretation of the Critique of Pure Reason, which is built in analogy with an experimental construction that Kant believes to characteristic of chemistry. I also argue for a way to reconcile the methodological perspective of the constructivist method with that of transcendental reflection. I therefore provide a constructive explanation for what Kant describes as being pure reason and the argument of the transcendental deduction. I propose to frame the different perspectives in such a way that the experimental construction is the ratio cognoscendi of pure reason, while pure reason is the ratio essendi of the experimental construction. O’Neill (1989, 2015) is one of the most important scholars that have argued for a constructivist reading of the Critique of pure reason (CPR). In this paper I develop and explore new aspects of this line of interpretation. One of the main criticisms raised against constructivist readings of Kant’s philosophy is an alleged commitment to subjectivism or voluntarism (cf. Kleingeld & Willaschek 2019). This concern led some scholars to rename their position as constitutivist instead (Korsgaard 2009; Sensen 2013, 2017; Formosa 2011). Constitutivism, is intended to be a sort of constructivism capable of avoiding voluntarism. However, it becomes difficult, sometimes, to differentiate between the constitutivist and foundationalist positions, which are based on transcendental reflection and imply a sort of realist perspective on reason. The same preoccupation applies to the constructivist interpretation of the CPR. In order to deal with this issue, the following questions must be addressed: how can constructivism justify the necessity and universality of transcendental principles of pure reason without compromising the normative and procedural aspects of the construction? How to reconcile arguments based on the analysis of representations and faculties with a constructivist procedure? Or even, how may transcendental reflection, as a view of the possibility of a priori cognition, be rendered compatible with a constructive procedure? This paper is divided into three sections, followed by brief final remarks. The first section outlines the main characteristics of constructivism and relates them to Kant’s positions about the nature of philosophy and its method. The second part argues for a type of experimental constructivism that might serve as a guiding analogy to understand the method underlying the CPR. Thirdly, I will show how the transcendental subject and pure reason are derived from this experimental construction. The conclusion briefly points out some advantages of this position.
Enlightenment as the normative principle of social rationality
2023
Studia Kantiana, v. 21, p. 99-117.
Joel Thiago Klein​
DOI: 10.5380/sk.v21i1.91982
Abstract:
​This paper argues that Kant’s philosophy entails a normative concept of social rationality distinct from other normative concepts such as moral and juridical rationality. I also argue that the normative demands of social rationality are embodied in the regulative idea of enlightenment which implies a profound intersubjective and moral character that unfolds in multiple layers and perspectives.
Permissive Laws and Teleology in Kant’s Juridical and Political Philosophy
Abstract:
In this article I argue that the current readings of permissive law fall into hermeneutical difficulties and do not completely explain Kant’s complex use of the concept. I argue that the shortcomings of these interpretations can only be overcome by relating permissive law to practical teleology. That teleological thinking has a role in Kant’s moral thought by way of history is not new. Here, however, I argue that the system of rights itself is in some manner teleologically situated. This interpretation allows us to understand that Kant’s Doctrine of Right plays the role of a realist utopia.
Kant and the idea of intergenerational justice
2022
In: Pinzani, A.; Caranti, L. (Eds.). Kant and the Problem of Politics: Rethinking the Contemporary World. Routledge.
Joel Thiago Klein​
DOI: 10.4324/9781003033837
Abstract:
In this chapter, I argue that Kantian practical philosophy contains solid elements from which we can justify a theory of intergenerational justice. Even though Kant never developed this issue systematically, I present a line of reasoning that sheds light on robust intergenerational moral claims in Kant’s moral philosophy that might potentially lead to an intergenerational formulation of the categorical imperative. This chapter also stresses the institutional path demanded by intergenerational justice and points to the broader horizon opened up by the idea of a universal history. Thus, Kantian philosophy of history provides us with a normative context for an intergenerational justice grounded in a concept of law that bears in itself a diachronic requirement.
On Serpents and Doves: The systematical relationship between prudence and morality in Kant’s political philosophy
Abstract:
In this chapter, I argue that Kantian practical philosophy contains solid elements from which we can justify a theory of intergenerational justice. Even though Kant never developed this issue systematically, I present a line of reasoning that sheds light on robust intergenerational moral claims in Kant’s moral philosophy that might potentially lead to an intergenerational formulation of the categorical imperative. This chapter also stresses the institutional path demanded by intergenerational justice and points to the broader horizon opened up by the idea of a universal history. Thus, Kantian philosophy of history provides us with a normative context for an intergenerational justice grounded in a concept of law that bears in itself a diachronic requirement.
Kant on Legal Positivism and the Juridical State
Abstract:
In this paper I argue that Kant’s political and juridical philosophy justifies a type of normative legal positivism that implies specific notions of law and legal freedom which determine and restrict the sphere of action of judges and jurists. Finally, I defend that, according to Kant’s practical philosophy, the normative connection between justice and law is not supposed to be carried out at the juridical level, as a meta-juridical theory, but at the political one, making it a meta-political theory.
Systematic perspectives on the distinction between appearances and things in themselves in the Critique of Pure Reason
Abstract:
In this paper I argue that in the first Critique and in the Prolegomena Kant's distinction between Appearances and Things in themselves do not belong to a single, one-dimensional system, but actually entails six different layers. Each layer has a particular perspective on the concept of things in themselves, which is used for drawing specific boundaries regarding appearances and is related to a particular kind of illusion. I also argue that these six different meanings of things in themselves are systematically articulated according the broader use of reason in its theoretical and practical field.
Kant’s constitution of a moral image of the world
Abstract:
In this paper, I argue that the idea of a universal history is systematically legitimized in Kant’s transcendental system of philosophy by way of the concept of a need [Bedürfnis] for pure practical reason. In this sense, the idea of a universal history is a fundamental part of the moral image of the world that emerges from Kant’s whole philosophy, and it is crucial for understanding both the possibility of the system of pure reason, as well the full development of Kant’s moral philosophy, especially for political philosophy.
Die Weltgeschichte im Kontext der Kritik der Urteilskraft
Abstract:
In this paper, I argue that the idea of a universal history is systematically legitimized in Kant’s transcendental system of philosophy by way of the concept of a need [Bedürfnis] for pure practical reason. In this sense, the idea of a universal history is a fundamental part of the moral image of the world that emerges from Kant’s whole philosophy, and it is crucial for understanding both the possibility of the system of pure reason, as well the full development of Kant’s moral philosophy, especially for political philosophy.
Published Books
